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qua's waiver was indeed voluntary and his request to contact his
mother unequivalent to a request for counsel, the oral confession
should not have been suppressed.
Apparently implicit in the Bevilacqua holding is an admonishment to law enforcement officials to refrain from conducting interrogations in any manner that would give even the appearance of an
effort to deny an unrepresented defendant access to a lawyer. It is
suggested that this underlying policy consideration, while laudatory
in principle, was accorded disproportionate weight in Bevilacqua
and thereby produced an unfortunate precedent.
Andrew A. Peterson
Postindictment waiver of right to counsel ineffective in absence of
attorney
New York courts long have recognized that a represented defendant can waive his right to counsel only in the presence of his attorney, and that any statements elicited in his attorney's absence must
be suppressed."'9 In People v. Coleman,"' the Court of Appeals
the defendant's legal rights. Id. at 2568-71. The proposition that a defendant's request to
speak with a family member is to be deemed a request for counsel stands in stark contrast to
the Supreme Court's critical observation: "If it were otherwise, a juvenile's request for almost
anyone he considered trustworthy enough to give him reliable advice would trigger the rigid
rule of Miranda." Id. at 2571.
"I People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976). The right
to counsel in New York was developed in a series of cases, along with the point at which the
defendant could waive that right without the advice of an attorney. In the first of these
decisions, the Court held that statements made by a defendant in the absence of his attorney
at an interrogation following his indictment were inadmissible. People v. DiBiasi, 7 N.Y.2d
544, 551, 166 N.E.2d 825, 828, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21, 28 (1960). In People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d
561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961), the Court unequivocally found that the return
of an indictment is the point at which the right to counsel attaches since it "marks the formal
commencement of the criminal action against the defendant." Id. at 565, 175 N.E.2d at 44748, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 74-75. A year later, the Court declared that a "post-arraignment statement should not be treated any differently than a post-indictment statement," and is inadmissible when elicited from a defendant in either situation in the absence of counsel. People
v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 164, 182 N.E.2d 103, 104, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427, 428 (1962). The right
to counsel was found to exist at the preindictment or prearraignment stages of a criminal
proceeding in People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 152-53, 193 N.E.2d 628, 630, 243 N.Y.S.2d
841, 844 (1963). The Court seemingly equated the filing of a criminal information with the
return of an indictment in People v. Bodie, 16 N.Y.2d 275, 213 N.E.2d 441, 266 N.Y.S.2d 104
(1965). The Court concluded that post-information statements elicited from a defendant in
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the absence of counsel are inadmissible, unless the defendant has waived his right to counsel,
which could be waived without the advice of an attorney. Id. at 278-79, 213 N.E.2d at 443,
266 N.Y.S.2d at 107. Following the federal mandate enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), that the right to counsel attaches at the commencement
of adversary judicial proceedings initiated by "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment," id. at 689, the New York Court of Appeals, in People v.
Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 320 N.E.2d 625, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1974), determined that the
"presence of counsel at identification viewings is mandated after the filing of an accusatory
instrument." Id. at 340, 320 N.E.2d at 631-32, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 891. Finally, in People v.
Sugden, 35 N.Y.2d 453, 323 N.E.2d 169, 363 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1974), the Court held that a court
order of removal was "sufficiently 'judicial' in nature" to invoke a defendant's right to counsel. Id. at 461, 323 N.E.2d at 174, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 929; see People v. Coleman, 43 N.Y.2d
222, 225-26, 371 N.E.2d 819, 822, 401 N.Y.S.2d 57, 59-60 (1977).
The requirement that a represented defendant have his attorney present to effectuate a
waiver of his right to counsel developed in a series of cases which spanned more than a decade.
In People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841-(1963), the Court
suppressed a confession elicited from the defendant at an interrogation held after his arrest
but before his arraignment, following a refusal to permit his retained counsel to speak with
him. Id. at 151, 193 N.E.2d at 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 843. The Court condemned the
"interrogation of an accused after he or the lawyer retained by him or his family has requested
that they be allowed to confer together." Id. at 153, 193 N.E.2d at 630, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 844,
Uncertainty as to what criteria needed to be satisfied to invoke the Donovan rule was alleviated somewhat by subsequent decisions of the Court. In People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226,
205 N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1965), it was held that "once a retained attorney contacts
the police officer in charge and informs him. . . that he represents the suspect and does not
want any statements taken from him, the police are precluded from. . . questioning him,
or, if they do, from using against him any statements which he made in the absence of
counsel." Id. at 232, 205 N.E.2d at 855, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 928. The parameters of the rule were
further delineated in People v. Friedlander, 16 N.Y.2d 248, 212 N.E.2d 533, 265 N.Y.S.2d 97
(1965), wherein the Court suppressed statements made by a represented defendant outside
the presence of her attorney notwithstanding that the defendant had not requested to have
counsel present at the questioning. See id. at 250, 212 N.E.2d at 534, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 98-99.
Finally, in People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968), the
Court held that "once the police know or have been apprised of the fact that the defendant
is represented by counsel or that an attorney has communicated with the police for the
purpose of representing the defendant, the accused's right to counsel attaches; and this right
is not dependent upon the existence of a formal retainer." Id. at 329, 239 N.E.2d at 539, 292
N.Y.S.2d at 666. Once an attorney is involved in a criminal proceeding, therefore, the
Donovan-Arthur rule prohibits the interrogation of the defendant in the absence of the attorney, unless the defendant first waives his right to counsel in the presence of his attorney. Id.
at 329, 239 N.E.2d at 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666. The Arthur Court also held that the rule does
not require a request by the defendant or his attorney that the police permit them to confer.
Id. Although the viability of the rule later came into question, see People v. Robles, 27 N.Y.2d
155, 263 N.E.2d 304, 314 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1971), the DonovanArthur rule was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeals in People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 48182, 348 N.E.2d 894, 896, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 420 (1976), discussed in The Survey, 51 ST. JOHN'S
L. Rav. 201, 216 (1976). Notwithstanding its reaffirmance of the rule, three exceptions to the
doctrine were recognized by the, Hobson Court. 39 N.Y.2d at 483, 348 N.E.2d at 897, 384
N.Y.S.2d at 422. The rule is inapplicable to situations where the defendant is represented
by counsel "in a proceeding unrelated to the charges under investigation," see, e.g., People
v. Taylor, 27 N.Y.2d 327, 332, 266 N.E.2d 630, 633, 318 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (1971), where the
defendant is not in custody, see, e.g., People v. McKie, 25 N.Y.2d 19, 23-28, 250 N.E.2d 36,
37-41, 302 N.Y.S.2d 534, 536-41 (1969), and where statements are "spontaneously volunteered" by the defendant, see, e.g., People v. Kaye, 25 N.Y.2d 139, 144-45, 250 N.E.2d 329,
331-32, 303 N.Y.S.2d 41, 46 (1969).
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held that an unrepresented defendant could waive his right to counsel, which attached when a court ordered a prearraignment lineup,
in the absence of counsel. 6 ' Following Coleman, uncertainty surrounded the point at which an unrepresented defendant would be
unable to effectuate a waiver bf his right to counsel in the absence
of an attorney.26 2 Clarifying this right, the Court of Appeals, in
People v. Settles,'2 3 recently held that a "defendant under indict26 43 N.Y.2d 222, 371 N.E.2d 819, 401 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977), discussed in The Survey, 52
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 485, 505 (1978).
2M,43 N.Y.2d at 226-27, 371 N.E.2d at 822, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 59-60. Coleman was an appeal
from a conviction of two counts of robbery in the first degree. Id. at 224, 371 N.E.2d at 820,
401 N.Y.S.2d at 58-59. The defendant had been required to appear in a lineup pursuant to a
court order directing his removal from a detention center in which he was incarcerated while
awaiting trial on an unrelated charge. Id. The prosecution claimed that the defendant had
waived his right to have counsel present at the lineup. See id. at 227, 371 N.E.2d at 822, 401
N.Y.S.2d at 60. Although he had retained an attorney for the unrelated charge, id. at 226,
371 N.E.2d at 821, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 59, he was not represented in the robbery investigation.
Id. The Coleman Court determined that, while a judicial order of removal was sufficient to
invoke the defendant's right to counsel, id. at 225, 371 N.E.2d at 821, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 59;
see People v. Sugden, 35 N.Y.2d 453, 461, 323 N.E.2d 169, 174, 363 N.Y.S.2d 923, 929 (1974),
the defendant effectively could waive his right in the absence of an attorney because he was
not represented by counsel on the robbery charges. 43 N.Y.2d at 226-27, 371 N.E.2d at 822,
401 N.Y.S.2d at 60. It should be noted that notwithstanding this conclusion, the Court held
that the prosecution had failed to establish that the defendant had voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Id. at 227, 371 N.E.2d at 822, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 61-62.
262The Donovan-Arthur rule permits a defendant who has retained counsel to waive his
right to counsel only in the presence of his attorney. See note 259 supra.Therefore, irrespective of the point at which a waiver is made, the represented defendant's abandonment of his
right to counsel will be effective only if made with the advice of his attorney. In People v.
Lopez, 28 N.Y.2d 23, 268 N.E.2d 628, 319 N.Y.S.2d 825, cer-.denied, 404 U.S. 840 (1971),
the Court upheld a postindictment waiver of counsel by an unrepresented defendant. Id. at
25-26, 268 N.E.2d at 628-29, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 826-27. The Lopez decision, however, was
overruled by the Court in People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 485-90, 348 N.E.2d 894, 899-902,
384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 423-27 (1976). Reaffirming the Donovan-Arthur rule, id. at 483-84, 348
N.E.2d at 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 421, the Hobson Court held that before indictment a defendant who has retained counsel may not waive his right to counsel outside the presence of his
attorney. 39 N.Y.2d at 481, 348 N.E.2d at 896, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 420. Since the DonovanArthur rule had no application to cases where counsel had neither been appointed nor retained, see note 259 supra, and since Hobson was represented by counsel while, in contrast,
Lopez was not, the propriety of the Court's overruling Lopez has been questioned. See The
Survey, 51 ST. JoHN's L. Rev. 201, 216 (1976). In any event, the overruling of the Lopez case
implied that a postindictment defendant, whether or not represented, could no longer waive
his right to counsel in the absence of an attorney. See 39 N.Y.2d at 493, 348 N.E.2d at 904,
384 N.Y.S.2d at 428 (Gabrielli, J., concurring); 51 ST. JoHN's L. Rv.at 220. The Court's
subsequent decision in People v. Coleman, 43 N.Y.2d 222, 371 N.E.2d 819, 401 N.Y.S.2d 57
(1977), which held that an unrepresented defendant in a preindictment setting could waive
his right to counsel in the absence of an attorney, left uncertainty with respect to the Court's
action in overruling Lopez.
2- 46 N.Y.2d 154, 385 N.E.2d 612, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978), rev'g 59 App. Div. 2d 598,
398 N.Y.S.2d 10 (2d Dep't 1977) (mem.).
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ment and in custody may not waive his right to counsel unless he
does so in the presence of an attorney." '
In Settles, a Queens County grand jury indicted the defendant
on charges stemming from the robbery of a Queens bar and the fatal
wounding of a police officer. ' After a warrant for his arrest was
issued, Settles was apprehended in Georgia. 66' Immediately upon his
return to New York, Settles was given his Miranda warnings and,
unadvised of his indictment and unrepresented by counsel, agreed
to appear in a lineup without the presence of an attorney.26 ' At the
lineup two witnesses identified the defendant as one of the participants in the crimes.268 This evidence was introduced at trial, and
Settles was subsequently convicted of robbery in the first degree. 68
The appellate division affirmed,20 and the defendant appealed.
In an opinion written by Judge Cooke, a unanimous Court of
Appeals reversed, declaring the filing of the indictment as the point
at which the defendant's "right to counsel . . . indelibly attached.1 21 In the absence of an attorney, therefore, the defendant
could not have validly waived his right to have a lawyer present at
the lineup. 2 Noting that when "an attorney has entered the proceedings," the right to counsel may be waived only in the presence
of an attorney,2 3 the Court "equate[d] the indictment with the
entry of a lawyer in to the proceedings," triggering the rule against
uncounselled waivers? 4 The Court distinguished its prior decision
28446 N.Y.2d at 162-63, 385 N.E.2d at 616, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 879 (citations omitted).
285Id. at 159-60, 385 N.E.2d at 614, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 876-77.
2e8Id. at 160, 385 N.E.2d at 614, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
287Id.

288Id.

Id. at 159, 385 N.E.2d at 613, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
27059 App. Div. 2d 598, 398 N.Y.S.2d 10 (2d Dep't 1977) (meri.).
27146 N.Y.2d at 165, 385 N.E.2d at 618, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 880-81.
28I

" Id. at 159, 385 N.E.2d at 613-14, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 876. The Court noted the possibility
of upholding a postindictment waiver made in the absence of an attorney but only where "the
most exigent of circumstances" were present. Id. at 164, 385 N.E.2d at 617, 412 N.Y.S.2d at
880.
82 Id. at 165, 385 N.E.2d at 618, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 881; see note 259 and accompanying
text supra. Judge Cooke observed that while the Donovan-Arthurrule previously had received
inconsistent interpretations, see People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 320 N.E.2d 625, 361
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1974); People v. Lopez, 28 N.Y.2d 23, 268 N.E.2d 628, 319 N.Y.S.2d 825, cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 840 (1971); People v. Vella, 21 N.Y.2d 249, 234 N.E.2d 422, 287 N.Y.S.2d
369 (1967); People v. Bodie, 16 N.Y.2d 275, 213 N.E.2d 441, 266 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1965), it was
reaffirmed by the Court as embodying an established principle of law in People v. Hobson,
39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976); see note 262 supra.
2' 46 N.Y.2d at 166, 385 N.E.2d at 618, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 881. The Settles Court noted
that its holding made "explicit that which was implicit in Hobson." Id. at 162, 385 N.E.2d
at 616, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 879; see note 262 supra.Thus, the inferences which were drawn from
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in Coleman25 by noting that Coleman had neither been indicted nor
arraigned when he waived the assistance of counsel. 6 Consequently, although the court order of removal to appear in a lineup
was sufficient to create the right to counsel in Coleman, the unrepresented defendant could waive his right outside the presence of-an
attorney.27 The Settles Court reasoned that the right to counsel
becomes "indispensible" after the indictment or arraignment, because at either of these points the investigatory stage is complete
and "formal judicial proceedings" have begun, thereby increasing
2 8
the defendant's need for the assistance of counsel. 1
the Hobson Court's action in overruling People v. Lopez, 28 N.Y.2d 23, 268 N.E.2d 628, 319
N.Y.S.2d 825, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 840 (1971), see note 262 supra, were verified by the
Settles Court.
275 43 N.Y.2d 222, 371 N.E.2d 819, 401 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977).
21 46 N.Y.2d at 165-66, 385 N.E.2d at 618, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 881. The Court stated that
"[tihe distinction between Coleman and the present case lies not in the question of under
what circumstances the right to counsel attaches, but rather at which point that right has
indelibly attached to the extent that it can only be waived in the presence of a lawyer." Id.
at 165, 385 N.E.2d at 618, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 880-81.
m Id. at 165, 385 N.E.2d at 618, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 881; see note 261 and accompanying
text supra.
21 46 N.Y.2d at 163, 166, 385 N.E.2d at 616, 618, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 879, 881. The Court
found that the transition in the duties of the police after indictment from investigatory to
accusatory was the reason for the rule that the defendant be arraigned without delay so as to
provide the defendant with legal advice as soon as possible. Id. at 163-64, 385 N.E.2d at 61617, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 879; see People v. Alex, 265 N.Y. 192, 195, 192 N.E. 289, 290 (1934);
People v. Mummiani, 258 N.Y. 394, 399-400, 180 N.E. 94, 96 (1932).
An additional issue addressed by the Court was whether, on remand, Settles would be
permitted to introduce into evidence a document prepared by police investigators which
summarized a statement made by Settles' codefendant, Boalds. 46 N.Y.2d at 166, 385 N.E.2d
618, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 881. In the statement, Boalds admitted committing the robbery, and
implicated a person other than Settles as his "lone accomplice." Id. Since the statement
constituted hearsay, the question arose whether it could be admitted as an exception to the
general rule that hearsay is inadmissible as evidence at trial. See W. RiCHARDSON, EVIDENCE
§ 200 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973). The Settles Court concluded that the statement could be
admitted under the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule for the
purpose of exculpating Settles, see id. at § 260, provided that the following four criteria were
satisfied:
[F]irst, the declarant must be unavailable as a witness at trial; second, when the
statement was made the declarant must be aware that it was adverse to his penal
interest; third, the declarant must have competent knowledge of the facts underlying the statement; and fourth, and most important, supporting circumstances independent of the statement itself must be present and attest to its trustworthiness
and reliability ...
46 N.Y.2d at 167, 385 N.E.2d at 619, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 822 (citations omitted); see People v.
Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 257 N.E.2d 16, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1970); cf. People v. Maerling, 46
N.Y.2d 289, 385 N.E.2d 1245, 413 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1978) (admission against penal interest used
to inculpate defendant). Finding that the first three requirements were satisfied, 46 N.Y.2d
at 167-68, 385 N.E.2d at 619, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 882, the Court left to the trial judge the
determination whether there was any independent evidence sufficient to establish the relia-
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By designating the time of indictment or arraignment as the
junctures after which an unrepresented defendant may no longer
waive his right to counsel in the absence of an attorney, the Settles
Court has removed some of the uncertainty clouding this essential
right that followed its decision in Coleman. The imminence of appointment or retention of counsel at the statutorily mandated arraignment, which must follow an indictment,2" apparently led the
Court to minimize the importance- of the interim period, since the
arraignment of an indicted defendant is "ministerial" only.20 It is
submitted that the same rationale could be applied with equal force
to proceedings commenced by the filing of a criminal information,
where the "ministerial act of arraignment" also must follow by statutory mandate.28l It would seem illogical to discount the significance of the interim period between indictment and arraignment,
and not that existing between the filing- of an information and arraignment. The judicial action in both cases appears to shift the
2 2
proceedings from investigatory to accusatory in nature. 1
bility of the hearsay declaration. The Court, however, did admonish that "[o]nly when there
is other evidence tending to show that the declarant or someone he implicates as his accomplice actually committed a crime, may a declaration against penal interest be said to display
the degree of reliability sufficient to overcome the dangers of admitting hearsay evidence" in
order to exculpate the defendant. Id. at 169, 385 N.E.2d at 620, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
"I CPL § 210.10 (Supp. 1978-1979) provides in pertinent part that "[a]fter an indictment has been filed with a superior court, the defendant must be arraigned thereon." Moreover, "[t]he defendant has a right to the aid of counsel at the arraignment and at every
subsequent stage of the action." CPL § 210.15(2) (Supp. 1978-1979). Should the defendant
not be represented by an attorney at the time of his arraignment, CPL § 210.15(2)(c) the
defendant must be given the opportunity to obtain counsel or "[t]o have counsel assigned
by the court in any case where he is financially unable to obtain the same." Id.
46 N.Y.2d at 166, 385 N.E.2d at 618, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
"' CPL § 170.10(1) (Supp. 1978-1979) provides in pertinent part that "[flollowing the
filing with a local criminal court of an information, a simplified information, a prosecutor's
information or a misdemeanor complaint, the defendant must be arraigned thereon." This
language closely tracks that of CPL § 210.10 (Supp. 1978-1979), which mandates that an
arraignment follow an indictment. See note 279 supra. Furthermore, CPL § 170.10(3), which
is analogous to CPL § 210.15(2), see note 279 supra, also requires that the defendant be
permitted to retain an attorney or be assigned counsel if the defendant is indigent. It must
be noted, however, that in cases involving a simplified information, CPL § 170.10(1)(a) does
not compel arraignment where the statutory procedure governing the simplified information
dispenses with an arraignment on the offenses charged in the instrument. The Settles formula
could be employed, therefore, only in proceedings commenced by an information, a prosecutor's information, a misdemeanor complaint, or a simplified information whose method of
enforcement requires an arraignment.
I" See note 278 and accompanying text supra.Under New York law, the "critical stage"
of the proceeding which invokes a defendant's right to counsel "begins with the filing of an
accusatory instrument." People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 339, 320 N.E.2d 625, 631, 361
N.Y.S.2d 881, 890 (1974); see note 258 supra. CPL § 1.20(1) (Supp. 1978-1979) defines an
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The Settles Court employed a novel formula of equating the
filing of an indictment with the entry of an attorney into the case
to afford the indicted defendant, represented or unrepresented, the
same protection given a defendant in a traditional Donovan-Arthur
setting.2 In so doing, the Court has taken another step in providing
an unrepresented defendant the same right to be protected against
"the coercive power of the State"2 4 as is a represented defendant.
While distinctions still exist between the ability of represented and
unrepresented defendants to waive counsel without an attorney
present, it is suggested that a defendant's right to counsel should
not depend upon such "fortuitous criteria" 285 as the speed with
accusatory instrument as "an indictment, an information, a simplified information, a prosecutor's information, a superior court information, a mipdemeanor complaint or a felony compliant." It has been noted that once an indictment or information has been filed, the nature
of the proceeding turns from investigatory to accusatory. See People v. Bodie, 16 N.Y.2d 275,
280-82, 213 N.E.2d 441, 444-45, 266 N.Y.S.2d 104, 108-10 (1965) (Fuld, J., dissenting). Furthermore, since the Supreme Court in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), held that a
defendant's right to counsel attaches upon the commencement of adversary judicial proceedings initiated by procedures which include the filing of an information, it would appear that
the right to counsel could be viewed as indelibly attaching at this point.
It is submitted, however, that in enlarging the scope of the rule to embrace the filing of
a criminal information, the Court should carefully weigh the desirability of a rule by which a
defendant can waive his right to counsel only in the presence of an attorney at all post-critical
stages of a criminal proceeding, against the possible adverse effects upon the efficiency of
police investigatory procedures that such expansion may cause. In People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d
331, 320 N.E.2d 625, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1974), Chief Judge Breitel stated:
[Ilt would be fine protection to defendants in criminal cases if they had counsel
at every stage of investigation and the ensuing judicial proceeding. Equally obvious
is it that such an arrangement would be impractical. . . . There is trenchant need
for a quick verification of identity, cause for arrest and detention, and the desirability of early or even immediate release of those falsely accused of crime.
Id. at 336, 320 N.E.2d at 629, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 888. In People v. Bodie, 16 N.Y.2d 275, 213
N.E.2d 441, 266 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1965), the Court determined that, although the right to
counsel attached following the filing of a criminal information, the right could be waived
effectively, if such waiver were made intelligently and voluntarily. Id. at 279, 213 N.E.2d at
444, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 107. It is suggested that, for pragmatic reasons, the court may be
compelled to revitalize these criteria in the postinformation, prearraignment context, when
called upon to squarely address this issue.
23 The object of the Donovan-Arthur rule is to prevent a defendant from being unwittingly deprived of his right to counsel and, concomitantly, to effectuate a criminal defendant's
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. See People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 485,
348 N.E.2d 894, 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 423 (1976); note 259 supra. Since the operation of
the rule was restricted to situations involving represented defendants, the unrepresented
defendant in identical stages of a proceeding did not enjoy the protection of the doctrine. The
Settles Court viewed this anomaly, at least insofar as an indicted defendant is concerned, as
"a distinction without a difference." 46 N.Y.2d at 164, 385 N.E.2d at 617, 412 N.Y.S.2d at
880. The Court stated that "[t]o ground an indicted defendant's right to counsel upon such
fortuitous criteria is to debase the right into nothing more than a race for the wary." Id.
2" 46 N.Y.2d at 164, 285 N.E.2d at 617, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
213Id. In Settles, the Court observed that an indicted defendant's right to counsel should
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which counsel may be obtained. In any event, the Settles case
represents another affirmative effort by the Court to "breathe life
into the requirement that a waiver of a constitutional right. . . be
competent, intelligent and voluntary." '
Gregory J. 0O'Connell

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

N. Y. U. C. C. § 3-419: Contractcause of action exists againstbank for
collecting an instrument over forged indorsement
Prior to the passage of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),
the payee of a negotiable instrument possessed valid causes of action in contract and tort against a bank that had collected the
instrument over a forged indorsement. 217 By exercising control
through collection in such a situation, the bank converted the instrument, and its liability for the conversion was limited by the 3year tort statute of limitations. 28 The payee, however, could elect
to ratify the bank's collection of the instrument, thereby waiving the
conversion remedy, and proceed under an implied contract for
money had and received, 289 with the resultant benefit of the longer
not depend on whether the defendant was represented. Id.
'u People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 484, 348 N.E.2d 894, 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 422
(1976).
2n Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 303 N.Y. 27, 100 N.E.2d 117 (1951) (contract); Hillsley v. State Bank, 24 App. Div. 2d 28, 263 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1st Dep't 1965) (tort),
affl'd, 18 N.Y.2d 952, 223 N.E.2d 571, 277 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1966); Spaulding v. First Nat'l Bank,
210 App. Div. 216, 205 N.Y.S. 492 (4th Dep't) (tort), aff'd mem., 239 N.Y. 586, 147 N.E 206
(1924); E. Moch Co. v. Security Bank, 176 App. Div. 842, 163 N.Y.S. 277 (1st Dep't 1917)
(tort or contract), affl'd, 225 N.Y. 723, 122 N.E. 879 (1919). See generally Note, Depositary
Bank Liability Under § 3-419(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 WAsH. & LEE L. Rxv.
676 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Depositary Bank Liability].
2m E. Mach Co. v. Security Bank, 176 App. Div. 842, 163 N.Y.S. 277 (1st Dep't 1917),
affl'd, 225 N.Y. 723, 122 N.E. 879 (1919); see CPLR 214(4) (1972 & Supp. 1978-1979). Since
the payee's indorsement had been forged, no title passed; therefore, when the bank processed
the instrument for collection, it committed a conversion by wrongfully exercising control over
a chattel to which it had no valid title. See E. Moch Co. v. Security Bank, 176 App. Div. at
846, 163 N.Y.S. at 280. The statute of limitations in tort runs from the date of the conversion.
General Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa, 18 N.Y.2d 125, 127, 219 N.E.2d 169, 170, 272 N.Y.S.2d 337,
339 (1966).
2U E. Moch Co. v. Security Bank, 176 App. Div. 842, 846, 163 N.Y.S. 277, 280 (1st Dep't
1917), affld, 225 N.Y. 723, 122 N.E. 879 (1919). Since the collecting bank in Hechter had no
title to the instrument because of the forged indorsement, see note 288 supra, by endeavoring
to collect on the instrument, it became
an agent [of the payee] for the purpose of collecting from the drawee bank the
proceeds of the check delivered to it. When it [took] the check for collection, it

